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Modern legal systems typically link the insanity or diminished responsibility of an offender for a crime 
committed in the past to his future dangerousness. This nexus serves across legal systems as a 
justification for the indeterminate commitment of the offender with diminished or no criminal 
responsibility. Conceptually, however, insanity and risk are not related legal issues. Moreover, 
empirical research suggests that there is only a weak link between insanity, diminished responsibility 
and mental illness on the one hand and risk of recidivism on the other. Other risk factors seem to be 
more important. The inference of risk from insanity or diminished responsibility that lies at the heart of 
the indeterminate commitment of mentally disordered offenders is therefore problematic. This should 
lead to a reconsideration of the preconditions for indeterminate commitment of mentally disordered 
defendants. 
 





Modern legal systems typically link the insanity or the diminished responsibility of an offender for a 
crime committed in the past to his future dangerousness.1 The presumed nexus between criminal 
responsibility – or rather: the absence or diminuition of responsibility – and risk serves as a justification 
for the indeterminate commitment of the ‘diminished or not responsible offender’ (‘DNR offender’). 
But is this link justified?  
In this paper we challenge this strong connection. Legal insanity and preventive detention refer 
to very different legal issues. One concerns responsibility for an act in the past, while the other concerns 
dangerousness in the future. Moreover, empirical research shows no more than a weak link between 
mental illness and crime or recidivism. Also, in current risk assessment tools for recidivism, mental 
illness plays only a limited or very limited role compared with other risk factors.  
Before elaborating these arguments, we will discuss four legal systems which, to various 
degrees, use a nexus between insanity or diminished responsibility and future dangerousness as a 
justification for indeterminate commitment: the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, and Norway. 
We conclude that, even though there is a weak connection between insanity and future dangerousness, 
this link is not sufficiently robust to justify the strong – sometimes even direct – connection between 
insanity and preventive commitment found in many legal systems. 
 
 
                                                          
1 We use ‘diminished responsibility’ in an informal sense, as expressing a lesser degree of responsibility due to mental disorder (cf. Meynen, 
2016, 161-163). Typically, this form of diminished responsibility may mitigate punishment, but may also be a precondition for commitment 
(see section 2). We do not use it in the formal sense of Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK), which states that diminished responsibility 
is a defense to a charge of murder. If this defense succeeds, the defendant is liable to be convicted of manslaughter. 
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2 Insanity and risk: an international perspective on indeterminate preventive commitment 
 
The inference of risk from insanity or diminished responsibility seems to take four forms. In this 
paragraph, we will explore these by means of a comparative analysis of the preconditions for 
indeterminate preventive detention in four legal systems. 
 This comparative analysis is limited to forms of preventive detention that may last for an 
indefinite period of time. This excludes preventive sanctions that are limited in time, such as the Dutch 
commitment of a person to a facility for repeat offenders (inrichting voor stelselmatige daders). This 
form of preventive commitment is limited to a maximum of two years (Section 38n Dutch Criminal 
Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, ‘Sr’)). Also excluded are forms of indeterminate commitment that are 
preserved for special groups of offenders, mentally disordered or not, such as the sexually violent 
persons laws in US jurisdictions (cf. Chapter 71.09 Washington Code). Indeterminate sanctions that do 
not consist of a deprivation of liberty, but rather a ‘mere’ restriction of liberty – for example 
indeterminate supervision of offenders (cf. Section 38z Sr) – are excluded as well. Nevertheless, parts 
of our analysis may well be relevant to these forms of preventive detention too. The four modalities are 
sketched in broad outlines. 
 
2.1 United States: an automatic inference from insanity to risk 
The first modality to be explored is an approach in which commitment is mandatory after a finding of 
insanity. In this approach, dangerousness is automatically inferred from the offender’s lack of criminal 
responsibility. 
If a defendant is found to be not criminally responsible because of his mental illness, US 
jurisdictions prescribe the special verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ (‘NGRI’) or some 
equivalent (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2008, 40-42). This special verdict was first used in the common 
law in the case against James Hadfield. Hadfield was declared not guilty by reason of insanity for the 
attempted assassinaton of King George III. According to the judgment, the special verdict would be a 
“legal and sufficient reason for his future confinement” (R. v. Hadfield, 27 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1281 (1800)). 
This verdict anticipated the Act for the Safe Custody for Insane Persons Charged with Offences, which 
was adopted shortly after Hadfield’s acquittal. This act made it mandatory for the judge to use the 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity when a suspect of a felony was acquitted because of a mental 
disorder and to have this person taken into strict custody for an indefinite period of time (“until His 
Majesty’s pleasure be known”). 
The case against Hadfield and the subsequently adopted legislation introduced an absolute and 
direct link in the common law between insanity and dangerousness, and thus the need to have the 
offender committed. In the United Kingdom, this link no longer exists (cf. Section 5 Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity) Act 1964). NGRI offenders fall within the scope of the Mental Health Act and a hospital 
order (Section 37 Mental Health Act) may or may not be made. The 2007 Mental Health Act is based 
on the notion that every mentally ill person should receive adequate specialist treatment, explicitly 
including mentally ill offenders. In US jurisdictions, commitment of NGRI offenders often is 
discretionary. In other US jurisdictions, the commitment of an offender found not guilty by reason of 
insanity is nevertheless still mandatory (Torcia, 2018, § 109). Most notably, mandatory commitment of 
the offender found to be insane exists in federal criminal law (Section 18.4243(a) United States Code) 
and is also found in the Model Penal Code (Section 4.08 MPC). The Model Penal Code is nowhere 
fully in force, but it has been an inspiration for many criminal codes at the state level. 
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The presumption underlying statutes prescribing the automatic commitment of a person 
acquitted by reason of insanity is that he,2 because of insanity at the time of the act, poses a danger to 
public safety.3 In the Commentaries on the Model Penal Code, an additional rationale is advanced: 
automatic commitment may also be beneficial to the offender by making the defense of insanity more 
acceptable to the jury and the public (American Law Institute, 1985, 256). 
 
2.2 The Netherlands: a conditional inference from insanity to risk 
Perhaps the most common legal approach to defendants acquitted by reason of insanity is to make their 
preventive commitment dependent on the fulfillment of one or more additional requirements, most 
notably that he is proven to be dangerous. 
 In the Dutch penal code, for example, Section 37a(1) Sr states that a defendant can be put at the 
disposal of the government (hospital order; terbeschikkingstelling, ‘tbs’) if two conditions are met: (i) 
he suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the act and (ii) the public security of persons or goods 
demands the commitment. Commitment is permitted in the interest of public security of persons and 
goods. Indeterminate commitment is allowed only if the tbs was ordered for a crime that was directed 
against, or caused danger to, the physical integrity of persons (Section 38e(1) Sr). 
 Section 37a(1) Sr does not explicitly refer to the insanity of the defendant 
(ontoerekenbaarheid). In fact, only a mental disorder at the time of the act is required. However, it is 
usually derived from the legislative history of the tbs that the defendant either had to be not responsible 
at the time of the act or at least have diminished responsibility by reason of his mental disorder. The 
main reason for introducing the tbs order in the first half of the twentieth century was that there appeared 
to be a group of defendants who were not wholly responsible, or not at all responsible, for their crimes. 
Prison sentences were deemed to be insufficient to protect society against this group of assumedly 
dangerous offenders. They could not be sentenced at all because of insanity or only to a short term of 
imprisonment because of their diminished responsibility: hence the need arose for a commitment order 
for DNR offenders (Van der Wolf & Mevis, 2017, 562). 
 The existence of a commitment order exclusively for DNR offenders implies that the legislator 
presumes the existence of a link between diminished or absent responsibility and risk (Van der Wolf & 
Mevis, 2017, 562). In the system described in this section, the responsibility-risk nexus is conditional: 
an actual risk still has to be established. However, the mere fact that a group of defendants is singled 
out for a preventive measure of indeterminate duration cannot but mean that this group is considered to 
pose a potential risk that defendants who are fully responsible do not. In Dutch legal practice, 
responsible defendants are not subjected to indefinite commitment.4 
 
2.3 Germany: insanity, diminished responsibility, responsibility and risk 
In some jurisdictions, not only DNR offenders can be subjected to indefinite commitment based on their 
dangerousness, but responsible defendants as well, including when they do not suffer from a mental 
disorder. In these jurisdictions, two separate forms of indeterminate commitment exist: one for DNR 
offenders and another for responsible defendants. 
                                                          
2 References to the masculine pronoun ‘he’ also include the feminine ‘she’. 
3 Cf. Jones v. US, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), 363-364: “We turn first to the question whether the finding of insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently 
probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) 
the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offence, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. Congress has 
determined that these findings constitute an adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill person. […] We 
cannot say that it was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination.” 
4 However, offenders sentenced to life imprisonment are deprived of their liberty for an indeterminate period of time (see Section 5). 
4 
 
 Section 63 of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, ‘StGB’) stipulates that a defendant who 
committed a crime in a state of insanity (Schuldunfähigkeit) or diminished responsibility (verminderte 
Schuldfähigkeit) can be committed for an indeterminate period of time to a psychiatric hospital if, 
because of this state, he is a danger to public safety. This indefinite commitment is comparable to the 
Dutch tbs order discussed in the previous section. In addition to the preventive commitment to a 
psychiatric hospital of Section 63 StGB, Section 66(1) StGB provides for preventive detention for 
responsible offenders (Sicherungsverwahrung) who have been sentenced to at least two years of 
imprisonment for a crime committed with intent (Vorsatz). The defendant must have been sentenced at 
least twice before to at least one year of imprisonment for a comparable crime, and he must have been 
sentenced at least once before to at least two years of imprisonment or deprivation of liberty by a 
preventive measure.5 It also has to be established that the defendant has an inclination (Hang) to serious 
(erheblichen) crimes. The Sicherungsverwahrung may be ordered for an indefinite period of time 
(Section 67d StGB) and can last for the rest of the offender’s life. 
 Thus, in Germany, not only DNR offenders but also offenders responsible for their crimes can 
be subjected to forms of indeterminate deprivation of liberty based on their dangerousness. However, 
the threshold for commitment to a psychiatric hospital is considerably lower than for commitment to 
Sicherungsverwahrung. This implies that in Germany, the DNR offender is considered to belong to a 
category that constitutes a dangerousness that is unlike the danger posed by the responsible defendant 
and thus requires a lower threshold to be committed to preventive detention. 
 
2.4 Norway: insanity, responsibility and risk 
To conclude this section, we briefly draw attention to a legal system that, unlike the ones previously 
discussed, does not infer dangerousness exclusively or predominantly from the insanity of the 
defendant. Section 62 of the Norwegian Penal Code (Straffeloven, ‘Strl.’) stipulates that an offender 
who committed a crime for which he cannot be held responsible (tilregnelig) due to the fact that at the 
time of the act, he was psychotic or suffered from a severe impairment of consciousness (pursuant to 
Section 20(1)(b) or (d) Strl.) can be committed for an indeterminate period of time to psychiatric care 
(tvungent psykisk helsevern; cf. Meynen, 2016, 36).6 Two further conditions have to be met. First, the 
offender must have committed or attempted to commit a violent offence, sexual offence, unlawful 
imprisonment, arson or other offence that infringed on the life, health or freedom of another person or 
could have put these legal interests at risk. Second, there must be an ‘obvious risk’ that the offender 
will again commit a serious crime that infringes on or puts at risk the life, health or freedom of other 
persons.7 
 Like its German equivalent, Section 60 StGB, this indeterminate (see Section 65(1) Strl.) 
commitment is comparable to the Dutch tbs order. A notable difference from both Germany and the 
Netherlands is that it can only be imposed on offenders who have been found to be entirely not 
responsible for their crimes (the concept of diminished responsibility does not exist in Norwegian 
criminal law). In addition, however, Section 40 Strl. provides for preventive detention of offenders who 
are found to be responsible for their crimes (including those who, in other systems, would be deemed 
                                                          
5 Section 66(2) and (3) StGB make some exceptions to this requirement of double recidivism in case of convictions of a certain severity. 
6 Under the same conditions that apply for tvungent psykisk helsevern, Section 63 Strl. provides for indeterminate commitment to medical care 
(tvungen omsorg) for offenders who are not accountable (utilregnelig) pursuant to Section 20(1)(c) Strl. because they are ‘severely mentally 
disabled’. 
7 Section 62(1) and (3) Strl. does allow commitment under alternative conditions (cf. Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen, 2016, 653). 
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to have diminished responsibility; cf. Section 40(4) and (5) Strl.; Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen, 2016, 
622). This preventive detention (forvaring) is an indeterminate form of punishment (Section 43(1) Strl.) 
that is available in cases where a determinate prison sentence is deemed insufficient to protect the life, 
health or freedom of other persons (Norway has no lifelong prison sentence; the maximum prison 
sentence is 21 or, in a few cases, 30 years). 
 The penalty of forvaring is largely subject to the same conditions as the indeterminate 
commitment to psychiatric care (cf. Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen, 2016, 652).8 This implies that the 
threshold for commitment to forvaring (contrary to the German Sicherungsverwahrung of Section 66 
StGB) is not considerably higher than for commitment to psychiatric care. To this extent, it can be 
maintained that in Norway, the imposition of a form of indeterminate preventive commitment or 
detention based on a risk of future offences is not inferred from the insanity or diminished responsibility 
of the offender.9 
 
As we have seen, modern legal systems infer dangerousness from the insanity or diminished 
responsibility of the defendant. The inference of risk from diminished responsibility or insanity is 
manifested in various forms of preventive detention for DNR offenders. Even in Germany, one of few 
jurisdictions that apply some form of indefinite preventive detention for fully responsible offenders, the 
threshold for preventive detention of DNR offenders is considerably lower. Of the four legal systems 
discussed above, Norway appears to be the only country where a risk of future recidivism is not 
predominantly inferred from insanity or diminished responsibility. 




3 Legal responsibility and risk: different normative evaluations 
 
The assumption underlying the inference of risk from insanity seems to be that if the defendant was not 
able to control his behavior rationally in the past, he will not be able to control his behavior in the future. 
The risks connected with the mental disorder then have to be dispelled by means of commitment and – 
in the course of the commitment – treatment (cf. Morse, 2011). 
The assessment of whether the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder at the time he 
allegedly committed the offense is based on an examination conducted by a psychiatrist and/or a 
psychologist. These behavioral experts focus on the time frame of the offense: an event in the past that 
usually took from a few seconds up to maybe fifteen minutes. For instance, stabbing a victim with a 
knife does not usually take longer than several seconds. If the criteria for insanity have been met, the 
defendant is not responsible.  
 Whereas the relevant mental state of the defendant for the assessment of insanity during the 
offense normally concerns fifteen minutes at most, and occasionally a short time before that period, the 
                                                          
8 One juridically notable difference concerns the fact that, for forvaring, the offender must at least be guilty of an offense that has infringed 
on the life, health or freedom of another person or has put these legal interests at risk (Section 40(1) Strl.; concrete endangerment), whereas 
for tvungent psykisk helsevern or tvungen omsorg it may suffice that the offender committed an offense that has infringed on the life, health 
or freedom of another person or could have put these legal interests at risk (Section 62(1) and Section 63(1) Strl; abstract endangerment; 
Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen, 2016, 653-654). 
9 But note that, as previously mentioned, offenders with diminished responsibility can be sentenced to forvaring.; and: the fact that abstract 
danger can suffice for tvungent psykisk helsevern is based on the presumption that offenders committed to this measure can on average more 
easily be assumed to be dangerous than other offenders (Gröning, Husabø & Jacobsen, 2016, 654). 
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time frame within which the defendant’s future dangerousness has to be assessed is neither defined nor 
specified. Therefore, its scope could in theory cover the rest of the defendant’s life. The dangerousness 
relates to recidivism – the commission of similar, but also of different, offenses – and thus switches the 
temporal perspective from the past to the future. The scope of inquiry therefore shifts dramatically, from 
the pinpointed moment of the offense to the boundless future, and the specific nature of the offense 
committed is relinquished for a more general risk of committing offenses. However, the specific loss 
of control due to a mental disorder at the time of the act is thought to be necessary as an ‘entrance 
requirement’ for indeterminate commitment.  
  Thus, legal insanity and preventive detention are very different legal issues. Legal 
insanity concerns the establishment of a lack of legal responsibility for an act in the past, while 
preventive detention deals with the legal question whether or not a defendant is sufficiently dangerous 
to justify a commitment order. A positive answer to one of these two questions does not imply the same 
answer to the other. Conceptually, irresponsibility for a particular act in the past is not directly tied to 
an increased risk in the unspecified future. However, it could be that in practice, a link does exist 
between a finding of insanity and future dangerousness. At the empirical level, the continued existence 
of the mental disorder that was of influence on the criminal responsibility of the defendant may very 
well be indicative of future dangerousness. As we will see in the next section, however, there exists 
only a weak link between mental disorder on the one hand and a risk of recidivism on the other.  
 
 
4 The weak link between insanity, mental disorder and dangerousness: empirical data 
 
It is at least doubtful that the presence of possibly severe mental illness as such leads to crimes. Elbogen 
and Johnson (2009) write that “severe mental illness alone is not an independent contributor to 
explaining variance in multivariate analyses of different types of violence”. They conclude that “it is 
simplistic as well as inaccurate to say the cause of violence among mentally ill individuals is the mental 
illness itself”. (Elbogen & Johnson, 2009; Meynen, 2016).  
 Often, psychosis is considered to be the typical mental condition leading to insanity. Slobogin 
(2017), for instance, writes that “the typical mental disorder associated with insanity is psychosis” (see 
also Morse, 2011, 1102). Therefore, it will be particularly informative to look at the relationship 
between this condition and crime/recidivism. Interestingly, according to Szmukler and Rose (2013, p. 
135), psychosis as such is not a strong predictor of violence compared to the general population: “people 
with a psychosis, in the absence of substance abuse or antisocial personality, are not much more likely 
to be violent than the general population.” Note that the general population is less violent, on average, 
than the offender population.  
This quote is in line with Fazel et al. (2009), who aimed to clarify the relationship between 
violence on the one hand and schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders on the other. They performed 
a meta-analysis of 20 studies, which, in total, included results from 18,423 subjects with schizophrenia 
and other psychoses. They found “an increased risk of violence in those with schizophrenia and other 
psychoses compared with the general population”. At first sight, this suggests that schizophrenia and 
psychosis are very relevant regarding risk. However, there was an additional finding, namely that 
“comorbidity with substance use disorders substantially increased the risk of violence”. In fact, as it 
turned out, “the increased risk of violence in schizophrenia and the psychoses comorbid with substance 
abuse was not different than the risk of violence in individuals with diagnoses of substance use 
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disorders”. “In other words,” they conclude, “schizophrenia and other psychoses did not appear to add 
any additional risk to that conferred by the substance abuse alone.”10 In the end, therefore, psychosis 
did not add any risk above the risk associated with substance abuse. In another study, Fazel et al. 
examined the risk of violent crime in subjects with schizophrenia (n=8,003) compared with general 
population controls (n=80,025) (Fazel, Långström, Hjern, Grann, & Lichtenstein, 2009). In this study, 
they also conclude: “The association between schizophrenia and violent crime is minimal unless the 
patient is also diagnosed as having substance abuse comorbidity.”11 These data suggest that the link 
between psychosis – the main condition associated with insanity – and  crime, including violent crime, 
is weak at most. 
 Another strand of empirical research concerns the development of risk assessment tools for 
offenders. For a couple of decades, a variety of risk assessment tools have been developed, tested, and 
implemented in many legal systems. Such instruments are, in general, used to determine whether 
offenders have a low, medium, or high risk of recidivism (this is therefore not a comparison with the 
general population, but with the group of other offenders). Some of these risk assessment tools are 
actuarial in nature, which means that their components as such do not rely on professional clinical 
judgment. For instance, the Static-99 is concerned with aspects of the crime and earlier criminal 
behavior (Hanson & Thornton, 2000), rather than the findings of a mental state examination. In fact, 
actuarial risk assessment tools have opened up a new way of looking at risk which reflects the way 
insurance companies perform their assessment. This is very different from the methods traditionally 
used in mental health care, where clinical assessments are common practice. Other tools include some 
professional clinical judgment (HCR-20, for instance).12 Risk assessment tools may include all kinds of 
information, provided the information contributes to the assessment of a person’s risk. That is basically 
the idea of risk assessment tools: as long as the factors add to their predictive accuracy, they can be 
included. Such risk assessment tools are therefore ‘pragmatic’ and a-theoretical (Andrews, Bonta, & 
Wormith, 2006).  
 In these assessment tools, mental illness is often a factor, but only one among many. In an oft-
cited meta-analysis, Gendreau et al. 1996 concluded about the strength of risk factors for recidivism: 
“The strongest predictor domains were criminogenic needs, criminal history/history of antisocial 
behavior, social achievement, age/gender/race, and family factors.”13 In general, criminal history is 
often considered to be the best predictor of recidivism (Eaglin, 2017). Therefore, mental illness is not 
only just one of many factors, but also not the most important risk factor. 
 It is even the case that in one risk assessment tool, the violence risk appraisal guide (VRAG), 
the presence of schizophrenia – a psychotic illness – is associated with a reduction in the risk of 
recidivism.14 In other words, in the VRAG, the condition most directly associated with a successful 
insanity defense reduces the risk of future dangerousness (Kooijmans & Meynen, 2012).  
                                                          
10 Emphasis added. 
11 More precisely, they state: “Among patients without comorbidity, adjusted ORs from comparisons with unrelated general population 
controls or unaffected siblings were 1.2 to 1.3.” 
12 Hart, Douglas, & Guy (2017, 102-103) write: “The Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ) approach is an analytical method used to 
understand and mitigate the risk for interpersonal violence posed by individual people that is discretionary in essence but relies on evidence-
based guidelines to systematize the exercise of discretion.” (Ref. omitted.) In the HCR-20V3, SPJ not only involves determining the presence 
of a risk factor, but also its relevance: “Risk factors may have differential relevance to individuals within samples, although on average they 
elevate risk within the sample. They do not necessarily affect risk in the same way for all people. ” (Douglas et.al., 2014.) The evaluator has 
to rate the relevance of the risk factors on a three-point scale. 
13 Quote from abstract. 
14 This association could not be proved in a sample of 136 German mentally ill offenders (Kröner, Stadtland, Eidt, & Nedopil, 2007, 97) and 
there is some debate about this association. Meehan et.al. found a “weak but definite association between schizophrenia and violence” in the 
general population (Meehan et.al., 2006). Meanwhile, it is important to distinguish between findings concerning the risk of recidivism in the 
group of offenders on the one hand and the risk of violent behavior from persons diagnosed with schizophrenia in the general population on 
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 In summary, if we look at risk assessment tools, they do not in any way single out mental illness 
as the main risk factor for future dangerousness. Interestingly, even in a population of those who were 
discharged after a NGRI verdict (New York State), it turned out that re-arrest was predicted by the same 
factors as in the general offender population: “Characteristics that exerted the greatest influence on re-
arrest among this mentally ill population were similar to those that predict re-arrest in the larger offender 
population (i.e., gender, age, antisocial diagnoses, and selective measures of prior arrests). These 
findings comport with prior research findings and speak to the importance of demographic and 
criminogenic factors in the prediction of arrest” (Miraglia & Hall, 2011). Therefore, even in a NGRI 
population – 83% had ‘psychotic’ as pre-release diagnosis – demographic and criminogenic factors 
were related to re-arrest rather than psychosis. The authors state: “Neither a history of psychosis nor 
one of substance abuse was predictive of re-arrest or re-arrest for violence within this population.” A 
diagnosis of antisocial personality did predict, but the authors also mention that such a diagnosis is 
related to criminal history – which is a very relevant point. Moreover, it is important to realize that an 
antisocial personality disorder is highly unlikely to lead to a successful insanity defense.  
 In conclusion, this section has shown that two important empirical approaches regarding risk 
of recidivism do not provide a justification for singling out insanity or diminished responsibility – and 
psychotic or other mental illness – as the main factor justifying indeterminate preventive detention; in 
fact, the opposite is true (cf. Beukers, 2017). Clearly, this does not mean that mental illness – and its 
treatment – is irrelevant regarding risk and risk reduction. More specifically, in individual cases severe 
mental illness may be an important risk factor.15 However, these findings do challenge provisions in 
criminal law that rely on a presupposed link between severe mental illness – required for insanity – and 
risk of recidivism (and preventive measures). 
 
 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Across different legal systems, the law exposes DNR offenders to potentially indeterminate 
commitment orders that are based on the defendants’ supposed future dangerousness. In contrast, 
responsible defendants typically are not subjected to these commitment orders. And even in legal 
systems where indeterminate commitment of responsible defendants is possible, the thresholds for 
ordering such a commitment are considerably higher than is the case with regard to mentally disordered 
defendants. The inference of risk of future recidivism from insanity or diminished responsibility that 
justifies the indeterminate commitment of mentally disordered offenders is, as we have shown, 
problematic. 
In fact, based on the discussion above, this inference seems to amount to an unjustified unequal 
treatment of DNR offenders. This is ethically and legally problematic. At least since Aristotle, it has 
been a core ethical principle that equal cases should be treated alike, to the extent that these cases are 
in fact equal. Across legal systems, unjustified unequal treatment is considered highly problematic. 
Moreover, this principle is enshrined in constitutions worldwide, including in the US (Amendment 
XIV), the Netherlands (Section 1 Grondwet) and Germany (Section 3 Grundgesetz). Empirically, there 
                                                          
the other. See also Caroll, Lyall, & Forrester 2004, 410-411: “Recent follow up studies of forensic patients suggest that the risk of serious 
reoffending is actually low. Earlier work suggests that even in the absence of statutory frameworks for ongoing surveillance, the future risk to 
the public from many forensic patients is not high.” (Ref. omitted.) 




is at best only a very weak link between mental illness and lack of responsibility for past criminal 
conduct on the one hand, and risk of future criminal conduct or recidivism on the other. This implies 
that, with regard to future dangerousness, the group of mentally disturbed offenders is in fact not very 
‘unequal’ to the group of criminally responsible offenders. The differences that do exist between the 
two groups cannot satisfactorily justify why mentally disturbed offenders – who already form, to a 
certain extent, a stigmatized group in society – are exposed to potentially indeterminate commitment 
orders, whereas responsible offenders generally are not.  
To be sure, responsible offenders may be sentenced to long prison terms, including life. The 
rationale for imprisonment or continued incarceration may very well – at least in part – be that the 
offender is considered dangerous. Hence, it might be argued that there is no need for indeterminate 
commitment of responsible offenders to address the risk they pose and that this could justify why 
mentally disturbed offenders can – and responsible offenders mostly cannot – be subjected to special 
forms of indeterminate commitment. Still, punishment is – except in rare cases of life imprisonment – 
typically not indeterminate (a notable exception, as we have seen, is the Norwegian penalty of 
forvaring), whereas the commitment of mentally disordered defendants often is. Punishment therefore 
does not necessarily adequately address the risk an offender poses (cf. Morse, 2011). Responsibility 
justifies punishment, but that does not imply that no responsibility as such justifies indeterminate 
commitment, which responsible offenders cannot be subjected to. Moreover, offenders with diminished 
responsibility may often be subjected both to punishment and indeterminate commitment. Therefore, 
the existence of sentences to which only responsible offenders may be subjected does not offer a 
justification for the indeterminate commitment of DNR offenders.  
Indeterminate deprivation of liberty is one of the most intrusive and psychologically 
challenging means by which the state can interfere in the lives of its citizens. The empirical basis for 
unequal treatment that amounts to indeterminate detention has to be very robust to justify such unequal 
treatment. This is not the case for indeterminate commitment of DNR offenders.  
The fact that mental illness is not an important risk factor has another serious implication for 
the justification of indeterminate commitment orders aimed at mentally ill offenders. Successfully 
treating the mental disorder during commitment may not lead to a sufficient reduction of risk for the 
person to be released. In Section 4.08(3) MPC, for instance, dangerousness is the criterion for release 
from commitment. In the Commentaries (American Law Institute, 1985, 259), it is noted that factors 
other than mental illness, such as personality and background, may also contribute to dangerousness. 
Successful treatment of the condition that is supposed to justify the unequal treatment of the mentally 
disordered offender, therefore, does not necessarily lead to his release, because dangerousness may 
continue to exist due to other risk factors.16 These other factors may even be static, such as the offender’s 
criminal history or gender, so that it is not even possible to reduce these risk factors. It is difficult to see 
what justifies the continued commitment of DNR offenders if they are dangerous because of factors 
that on their own do not suffice for the imposition of commitment in the first place. 
 
                                                          
16 In the Netherlands and Germany, it is a legal prerequisite for the continuation of commitment that the mental disorder is the continuing 
cause of future dangerousness. Especially when general risk assessment tools are being used as described in section 4, in practice, the risk 
caused by the disorder may not be distinguishable from the risk caused by other risk factors. In effect, these other risk factors may very well 
be more important in the general risk assessment. Therefore, notwithstanding the requirement of causality between disorder and risk, the same 
problem may arise in these legal systems as well. (Kooijmans & Meynen, 2012.) A survey of Dutch case law on the imposition of tbs orders 
shows that most judgments indeed rely on the need to treat a mental disorder to reduce dangerousness. However, it also is noted that mental 
health experts, in their treatment of those committed under tbs orders, increasingly address risk factors other than mental disorder (Van der 
Wolf & Mevis, 2017). 
10 
 
In conclusion, in modern legal systems we typically find a strong and sometimes even direct connection 
between insanity on the one hand and risk and indeterminate preventive detention on the other. In this 
paper, we have challenged this connection. The inference of risk from insanity or diminished 
responsibility as a justification for indeterminate commitment for mentally disordered defendants 
should therefore be reconsidered by legislators. In addition, other factors reflected in risk assessment 
tools should receive more attention in this respect. In our view, it would be valuable to explore legal 
models of commitment that do not assume a link between insanity and dangerousness – such as the 
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